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is

a

counts

§ 18-501 ( l ), with an enhancement of the final count
of

bodily

pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-2520R R.342-44.

was

convicted on September 11, 2014 and sentenced on October 24, 2014. R.342-44, 429-33 On
Counts I, II, and VI,

vvas sentenced to a fixed term of five years and five years

indeterminate. R.429-33; THI: 1859-61. On Count III, which the trial court entered conviction as
a

enhancement, the trial court sentenced Sellers to a ten-year fixed term and fifteen years
indeterminate. Id. All of these sentences were ordered to run concurrent. Id. A total fine
$4,000, court costs of $1,039.50, and reimbursement for the cost of the defense expert was
ordered. Id. Sellers filed a timely notice of appeal on November 13, 2014. R.455-59.

Statement ofthe Facts
Background
Cody Sellers ("Sellers") met Amanda Baret ("Baret") in the summer of 2011. TUI: I 33839. Baret and Sellers moved in together in Baret's apartment in Pocatello in late August/early
September of 2011. TIII: 1342-43. Baret's one and a half year old daughter, N.T., lived with
Baret. TIII:1345. In October/November of 2011, the three moved into Sellers' home in Big Sky,

1 For the sake of clarity, references to record are designated with "R." followed by page numbers. References to the
trial transcript are referred to by "T" followed by transcript volume, and references to the preliminary hearing
transcript are referred to with the abbreviation "PH."

IV

1346-

was

R.18;

at 26

THI: 1334-35. N.T. was in Primary Children's Hospital for four months after bilih due to medical
conditions associated with her prematurity, including retinopathy of prematurity and "gradeintraventricular hemorrhage on both sides" of the brain. TI:457, TIII: 1334-36. N.T. also
a large portion of her bowel and her colon removed.

Initially upon coming

home to Baret's residence from the hospital after her birth, N.T. had an ostomy bag. TIII:1337.
N.T. continued to suffer digestive issues after removal of the ostomy bag due to her "short
"Tl:465; TII:700-01.
N.T. experienced some developmental delay. TII:946-53. In the spring of 2012, N.T. was
just beginning to walk and talk. TII:648-50; TUI: 1365-66. N.T. had an infant/toddler therapist
who worked frequently with her to help with developmental concerns. TIII:1358-59. The State's
medical experts, Dr. Campbell and Dr. McPherson, and N.T.'s treating pediatrician, Dr. Hardin,
testified that both the retinopathy of prematurity and the intraventricular bleed were resolved
prior to spring of 2012. TI:463; Tll:946, 972-73, 1120.
According to Baret, in February of2012 she began to observe changes in N.T.'s
behavior. THI: 1357. Specifically, N.T. appeared to be more
1362.

and Torres

observed

V

and had less
onN.T.

an appetite.

N

THI:

on
at

something was

to come

N.T as '·she look[ed] dead. TIII: 1363. Sellers indicated at that time

. had fallen

asleeping and landed on her

TI:467-68, 593; TTII:1367.

When Baret arrived at the Big Sky home, N.T. was lucid but "tired and throwing up a lot." Id
Baret and

N.T. to the Pocatello Children's Clinic ,vhere she saw Dr. Murdoch.

TI:580-83. TIU: l
Murdoch

Dr. Murdoch ordered a CT and blood work. TI:592-94; TIil: 1368. Dr.
bruising and made a note of concern regarding abuse. TI:586-91, 594-97.

N.T. was taken to PortneufMedical Center for the CT which came back normal. TIII:1368.
Torres met the parties at the hospital and N.T. "was acting normal. She was giggling. She was
walking." TlI:670. It was later learned that the March 22, 2012 CT was in fact not normal and
the radiologist and doctor missed a subdural hematoma on N.T.'s brain. TIII:1510-11.
After the March 22, 2012 episode, Sellers' mother suggested that Sellers take video of the
episodes. TTIII:1380-81. Baret reported that after March 22, 2012, N.T. continued to "thr[o]w up
a lot" but "would still play and be happy." TIII:1369. On April 3, 2012, N.T. had "another one
her episodes" while Baret was at work. T[:468; TIII: 1371. Sellers was home with N.T. at the
time and video recorded N.T. on his cell phone. TIII:1371, 1403; Ex.I. N.T. was "screaming" in
a way Baret described, "I have never heard that scream come out ofmy child, ever." TIII:1
Again, Baret and Sellers took N.T. to the Pocatello Children's Clinic. TIII:1371-72. N.T. was
seen by Dr. Mcinturff~

scheduled an

for April 5, 2012, to see ifN.T. had any

VI

not
Dr. Mclnturff testified

did not observe "any bruises or

on her"

she was a little bit behind in her gross

and

motor skills. TII:781. Dr. Mcinturff reviewed the notes from the March

2012 visit but "was

more worried that she had something going on with her abdominal and GI tract" given N.T.'s
history. TII:782-83. Dr. Mcinturff did not believe the episodes described by Sellers and Baret
,vere

TII:788-92.According to

April 3,

was still vomiting and

but did not have any additional "episodes" for "quite some time." THI: 1376.
Torres testified that on April 6, 2012, N.T. became ill and vomited while in his care at his
birthday party with no display of

. TII:671

697-99. N.T. was seen

Dr. Brian Fulks on April 9, 2012, at the Pocatello Children's Clinic. TII:921-40. Baret took N.T.
into the clinic due to the vomiting and diarrhea. TII:926. Dr. Fulks' general exam was
"unremarkable" but he was concerned about hydration and potential bacterial or viral illness. Id.
Dr. Fulks spoke to intestinal specialists at Primary Children's Medical Center. TU:928. Dr. Fulks
did not follow-up on the concerns from the previous visits, although he testified that head trauma
can cause ·'nausea and vomiting" but "[i]t usually does not cause diarrhea. TH:934.
N.T. was seen by her primary pediatrician, Dr. Creighton Hardin of the Pocatello
Children's Clinic, on April 12, 2012 for her nur,_u,,
began treating

well-child check. TII:953-56. Dr. Hardin
until October of 2012.

at three months and was

Vil

up
that on

Dr.

forN.T.

notes
12, "[t]or [N.T.] ... ,
approximately one

exam was normal." Id.
Baret and Sellers went to Las

Vegas, Nevada in mid-April and Torres did not witness any episodes during that time, nor at any
time vvhile

was in his care in the spring of 2012. TII:675, 735. On April 30, 2012,

N.T. had another episode while in Sellers's care

he video recorded part of the episode using

phone. TIII: 1404; State's
According to Baret, on May 2, 2012, N.T. had two episodes in the morning while Baret
\Vas present. TI II: 13 79. Sellers took video of the second episode. Ex. I. Baret scheduled an
appointment with N.T.'s regular pediatrician, Dr. Hardin, at the Pocatello Children's Clinic but
later cancelled the appointment due her feeling that the doctor was not taking her concerns
seriously. TIII: 1379. Dr. Hardin testified that Baret contacted the clinic and provided him a video
ofN.T. TII:957. According to Dr. Hardin, the video showed N.T. "on her back on the floor
rolling back and forth. [ think I made a mention that she ·wasn't arching. There were no seizurelike activities. It could be a temper tantrum, or it could be that she was just uncomfortable." Id.
Dr. Hardin told Baret that it may be "reflux" and suggested to continue videoing. Tll:958.
3, 2012, Torres had custody ofN.T. whiile he was in the process of moving to a
new appartment. TH:677, 691. Two witnesses present during the day observed N.T.'s behavior:

VIII

N

12,

to

Baret described
and I would drop her

a game with

" Id. On this particular

she would "hold [N.T.] over
Baret

THI: 1384. Baret left for work at that point, leaving Sellers to care
approximately 11 :00 am, Sellers texted Baret at
episode, but it looked different." THI: 1

N.T. by playing this
N.T. Id.; THI:1404. At

"saying [N.T.] was having another

State's Ex. (Text Message Log). Sellers sent Baret a

TIH:1384: State's Ex.3 (l l:Olam Video). In
approximately twenty (20) seconds each over a
Ex.3-6. Medical

crib,

Sellers

four videos of

of approximately twenty minutes. State's

viewed the videos and testified that it appeared that N.T.'s physical

condition deteriorated over the course of the 20

TI:473; TU:1160.

Baret contacted Dr. Hardin who instructed her to bring

to the clinic. TII:959. Baret

and Sellers took her to the clinic at approximately 11: am. THI: 1385. When Baret arrived home,
N.T. was "alternating between these moments where she would just be laying there to stiffening
up and making these God-awful sounds." TUI: 1386. Dr. Hardin observed N.T. for less than five
minutes before instructing them to take N.T. to Portneufs emergency room. TII:680; TUI: 1387.
Dr. Hardin testified that N.T. "definitely had an abnormal neurologic exam[,]" "was quite
stiffI,]" and \Vas "encephalopathic." TH:960. Dr. Hardin also testified that N.T. "had normal air
exchange" at the time N.T. was brought in. TII:965.

s

to
TI!I:1388.

Torres

Sellers traveled to Salt Lake City to be with N .T. Tll:681;

TIH:1388. N.T.'s injuries \Vere
retinoschisis,

N.T. had a diffuse subdural hemorrhage, TI:478;

bilateral retinal hemorrhaging, TI:476. The State's medical expert, Dr.

CampbelL opined that as a result of the injuries, N.T.'s brain atrophied and experienced brain
shrinkage creating neurological disabilities. TI:488. N.T. was in PCMC for about a month
the May 4 111

before she was

N.T. could not speak,

walk, or feed herself TII:686, 1177. N.T. could stand with assistance and could not pick up
objects. TII:687. She had to be fed through a tube.

1-52. See also TII:962-63.

Investigation & lvfedical Evidence
Pocatello Police Detectives arrived at PrimaryChildrens'. TI:610-12. They interviewed
Baret, Sellers, Torres, and spoke to the treating physicians. TI:611-15. Sellers was interviewed at
by Sergeant McClure and described Sellers demeanor as "indifferent." TI:614-15; Ex.41. Shortly
after, the case was turned over to Power County detective Sprague. TI:620. During the course of
Sprague's testimony at trial the State introduced two interviews Sprague conducted with Sellers,
one on May 10, 2012 and the other on June 4, 2012. TH:836-63, 995-1059; State's Exs. 42, 43.
Sprague's

established that on March 22, April 3, April 30, and May 4, of 2012,

Sellers' had custody ofN.T. while Baret was at work. TII:1002-04, 1061; State's Exs.
Sprague had

and

X

phones

31, 32,

's

1-1

Campbell (PCMC)

2012 at 11

4,

4,

101

1,

1071-

Dr

Tlll: 1201-06.

also called four doctors from the Pocatello Children's Clinic to testify regarding N .T. 's
treatment

TI:575-605 (Dr. Matthew Murdoch); TII:775-99 (Dr. Don Mcinturff); TH:91

39 (Dr. Brian Fulks); TII:940-85; Tll:940-93 (Dr. Creighton Hardin). On cross-examination,
Pocatello

Clinic doctors

Sellers' trial against the doctors involved in N
Dr. Campbell treated

a civil lawsuit was pending at the time of
's treatment. TII:987.

after her arrival at PCMC. TI:450. The PCMC treating team

performed tests to rule out other potential, non-abuse related causes of the injuries. TI:522-23;
see also TII: 1168. Dr. Campbell testified that the subdural hemorrhage was "what we usually see

in shaking injuries." TI:480. Further, Dr. Campbell testified that the injuries were indicative of
an immediate onset of symptoms and not injuries from a "short fall." TI:483, 488. Dr. Campbell
also testified generally regarding abusive head trauma. TI:404-50.
The State called Dr. McPherson as an expert in child abuse pediatrics and he testified
regarding abuse injuries in children, including abusive head trauma. TII: 1071-1200; TIII: 120106.

McPherson opined that with symptoms like "bleeding on the brain, severe bleeding in the

eyes, and brain swelling ... there would be little, if any, delay from the time of the event to
\vhen" the symptoms appeared. Tm: 1105, 1175. Dr. McPherson testified that

retinal

" TI: 1112- 3.
N.T.

4, 20 l 4 episode, including

care as a
videos taken by

TH: 1118. He testified that he "did
be predisposed to

sustained or identified on or after March 22nd[.]" TII:11
that

injuries

Dr. McPherson opined

a reasonable degree of medical certainty" the injuries sustained by N.T. were

consistentvvith abusive events. Tll:1133-34, 1143; TIII: 1540-41.
TIII:1222-1302. She

The defense called Dr. Janice Ophoven as their medical

"performed an independent forensic analysis of the case of [N.T.]" TUI: 1227. Dr. Ophoven
opined that N.T.'s injuries could have resulted from increased pressure due to the scarring from
the ventricular bleeding shortly after N.T.'s birth and that N.T.'s neurological issues were
"ongoing over a course of months." TIU: 1231

She

that there was "no evidence to

support the opinion that the child has suffered a traumatic brain injury that was inflicted" on the
date of symptomology. THI: 1247. Dr. Ophoven questioned the practice of diagnosing abusive
head trauma in medical circumstances where other known potential causes of injuries have been
diagnostically eliminated, but there is no outward or other indication of trauma other than the
injuries themselves. TIII: 1249, 1292-93.
On rebuttal, Dr. McPherson testified that ifN.T. had a spontaneous bleed of the kind
described by Dr. Ophoven, "[N.T.] would be the very first case report
we

following neonates or premature babies

XII

all of [reported] history

this problem." Tm: 1507.

to a

counts
§ 18-1

with an

Idaho

§1

R.11-1

of Probable Cause supporting the Complaint alleged that on four different dates
March

through May 4, 2014, Sellers willfully inflicted injury on N .T. R.18-20. The

complaint alleged in Count IV that Sellers failed to seek medical attention on May 4th. R.19-20.
Count V was charged \Vith an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury upon N.T. on May
4, 2012. R.14. The enhancement charged that N.T. suffered "subdural hemorrhages and/or

bilateral

hemorrhages and/or bilateral retinoschisis[.]" Id.

The case was before the Honorable Paul Laggis but defense counsel filed a Motion to
Disqualify and it was reassigned to the Honorable R. Todd Garbett on December 4, 2013. R.6364, 69. However, the case was ultimately heard by the Honorable Stephen S. Dunn. A
preliminary hearing was held on January 27, 2014. R.101-03. Sellers was bound over on all five
counts of felony injury to a child and the enhancement. Id. On February 13, 2014, Sellers was
arraigned and pied "not guilty" to all of the charges. R.113-15.
On April l, 2014, Sellers filed a "Motion to Dismiss Count V, Enhancement," R. 125-27;
and a "Motion to Dismiss Count JV or V," based on double jeopardy issues. R.128-30. These
motions were heard on April 10, 2014. R.136; TI: 1-30. The trial court denied both motions by
written order on April 23, 2014. R.176.
On September 2, 2014, the trial court addressed the following
for sequestration, TI:47-52 (motion denied); defense's objection to the

xm

defense's motion
of jury

term
to prohibit use of the terminology "abusive head
motion

"Tl:73-76 (motion
(motion

missing polygraph

and to exclude the post-polygraph interview recording, TI:83-88 (motion denied);
motion to exclude the State's demonstrative videos that were disclosed late, Tl:88-97
(motion granted); defense's motion in limine regarding cumulative testimony, TI:97-98 (issue
motion to exclude evidence regarding the Child Protection

case and custody

and motion to bifurcate the

TI:98-102, 105 (granted to limited

enhancement TI: I 02-106 (granted as to the instructions but denied as to bifurcating the evidence
for

enhancement). The trial court also reviewed the

with counsel on the day

prior to trial after hearing final pretrial motions. Tl: 109-12.

The jury trial was held from September 3-5 and 8-11 of 2014 in the Sixth District Court,
Power County, before the Honorable Stephen S. Dunn. See R.348-55. Jury selection took most of
the first day of trial. TI: 120-349. The State called a total of fourteen (14) witnesses. R.351. The
evidence adduced through these witnesses tended to show that on four dates in spring of 2012,
Sellers was providing care for the minor child, N.T., and that N.T. evidenced neurological
symptoms consistent with abusive

trauma. See, e.g., TH: l

R.351. The defense case tended to

that

XIV

1. The defense called four
was not

character to

On the sixth day of the
State did not

to

the jury was

post-proof instructions. TIII: 1564-75. The

1559. Defense

objected to the lack

"willful'' instruction on each element instruction and to the use of the standard "beyond a
reasonable doubt instruction." TIU: 1559-60. The trial court previously determined that the
instructions would be bifurcated; the jury would be given instructions regarding Counts I through
V (instructions l l through 27), then if Sellers was

on Count V, the jury would be

given instructions on Part II, the great bodily injury enhancement (instructions 28 and 29).
TI: I 05. During deliberations, the jury sent back a question: "Do we look at each charge without
considering what happened with any other charge? Or we look at them at all as interrelated?"
TIII: 1636. Thereafter, the jury returned an initial guilty verdict on Counts I through V.
TIII: 1649-50. The trial court instructed the jury as to Part II, the enhancement. TIII: 1650-52.
While the jury was deliberating Part II, defense counsel notified the trial court regarding errors in
the instructions. Tm: 1653-54. Defense counsel argued that it would be inappropriate to reopen
the verdict and reinstruct the jury because the charged instructions were for "misdemeanor"
injury to a child and thus jeopardy had attached when the verdict was put on
The trial court

the jury was "inconsistently" instructed

instruction number 2 included the proper elements while instructions 1

62.

trial court

that

the jury had not been

xv

it

record. Id.
charging

did not. TIII:1661be appropriate to

II

came to
TIU: l 670. That verdict was not

THI: 1670-72.

and

21

the

trial court then provided
to return

following

. THI:1673-75. The parties and the trial court continued to discuss the instructions while the
deliberated the next day. TIH: 1676-97. The

argued that the reinstruction was proper

v. Hickman, a 2008 Idaho Supreme Court decision involving a missing element
THI: 1677-78. Defense counsel to argue that the

acquiesced in the instructions

and that jeopardy attached to the "misdemeanor" convictions. TIII:1679-83.
The trial court found that looking at ICJI 1
the misdemeanor

"a reasonable argument could be made

to a child standard instruction. Tm: 1685. As to ICJI 1244,

"(t]here's no question that that is specifically a felony injury to child instruction." TIII:686-87.
The trial court went on to compare the circumstance to that in State v. Young, a 2001 case, where
the first six elements of felony injury to a

were given, thereafter

special circumstance

instruction. TIII:1687-88. The trial court found that was ··exactly what we did here." Id.
The trial court noted that the enhancement instruction number 28 previously submitted to
the jury was also
"special

error. TIU: 1691-93. Thereafter,
instruction. THI: 1698-99.

jury submitted a question regarding the
trial court instructed the jury to, "Please

refer to the instruction given with this verdict form." THI: l 701. After further deliberations, the
jury submitted another inquiry

whether they needed to continue deliberating if they had

xvr

IIL THI: 1710-13. The trial court re-instructed the
the modified

28 instruction. TIII:1715. The

as to Count V. TIII:1716-17.
Post-Trial
Sellers filed a Motion for
on October
for

Trial and Motion for

2014, the same day as

sentencing. TIII: l

Trial argued Sellers should be granted a new trial

excused for cause; (2) cumulative

These motions were heard
861; R.429.

Motion

(l) Juror 20 should have

testimony; (3) prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the second

deliberations issue; and (5) cumulative error. R.359-63. The Motion for Acquittal argued
insufficient evidence as to Counts I, II, and III. Both of motions were denied. R.434-54.
On Counts I,

IL and VL Sellers was sentenced to a fixed term of five years and five

indeterminate. TIII: 1859-61. On Count

years

IIL which the trial court entered conviction as a

misdemeanor, Sellers was sentenced to one year. Id. Finally, on Count V and the enhancement,
the trial court sentenced Sellers to a

fixed term and fifteen years indeterminate. Id. All

of these sentences were ordered to run concurrent. Id. A total fine of $4,000, court costs of
$1,054.50, and reimbursement for the cost of the defense expert was also ordered. Id.
After sentencing, Sellers filed a Rule 35 Motion arguing that the sentence was '·unduly
harsh or

"R.478-79.

motion was denied. R.480-8 l.

XVII

a

and

to

result was consideration of

attempting to correct the instructions.
''°"'"-u".uuv,

a confused

offenses where none were properly

. Sellers should

a new trial.

Second, Sellers argues that the misdemeanor conviction

by the trial on Count III

was not appropriately before the jury, nor were all the elements in Idaho Code § 18-150 l (2)
. This conviction should be vacated.
Third, Sellers argues that the trial court en-ed in allowing Counts IV and V to be tried
separately as they were part of a single criminal

violating constitutional double

'-IJ•.,v,~ ....

jeopardy protections. The convictions should merge

Sellers' sentence for one of the offenses

vacated. Fourth, Sellers argues that the trial court improperly denied motions for cause to remove
biased jurors. The result was that Sellers lost a peremptory challenge and an actual biased juror
sat on the jury.
Fifth, Sellers asks the Court to correct the illegal sentencing issues raised as to Counts III,
IV, and V. Sellers also argues that the sentences for the convictions were unduly harsh given the
circumstances.
not all of the

asks the Court to reduce his sentences.
errors were prejudicial, combined,

should receive a new trial.

1

errors

Sellers argues that even if
Sellers due process and

instructions to

jury in the

round of deliberations failed to include

element of "under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death"
of felony injury to a child under Idaho Code § 18-1501 (1 ). R.321-

26, 334-35 (Instructions l 6-2 L & 27). The jury found Sellers guilty based upon those
instructions.

trial court dealt with the initial jury determination as "misdemeanor"

convictions under Idaho Code § l 8-150 l (2) throughout the remainder

the trial. The trial court

instructed the jury in the "corrected" instructions that it had already found Sellers guilty of
Counts I through V when in fact no finding had been made on the necessary "circumstances or
conditions" element in the initial verdict. R.327, 336-37 (Instructions 2 I A, 28, 28 Modified).
In total, the jury deliberated four separate verdicts total: (1) Count I through V without all
of the felony elements; (2) the Part II bodily injury enhancement with an incorrect instruction;

(3) ,vhether "special circumstances" applied to Counts I through V; and (4) the Part TT
enhancement with a corrected instruction. R.352-54. This combination of events appears to be
unique in Idaho, raising new issues of!a\v, procedure, and error. See TIii: 1765.
By not including the circumstances/conditions element required for felony injury to a
child ("under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death") in the
first set of

and not explaining this error to

2

jury, the

court placed

jury in

were on an
to
As

confusion surrounding the jury instructions, verdicts and

the jury instructions and

forms

rights

Sellers' due

resulted in reversible error.
record after the initial verdict was rendered,

These issues were preserved, in part, on

in Sellers' Motion for a New Trial, R.362; TIII: 1653-98; and even if they were not preserved,
are so essential to affording due process that

qualify as fundamental error necessitating

See State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (Idaho

I 0).

Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which this Court
free review. State v. Gleason, 844 P .2d 69 l, 694 (Idaho 1992). In reviewing jury
instructions for error, this Court looks to whether "the instructions, as a whole, fairly and
adequately present the issues and state the law." State v. Sheahan, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (Idaho 2003).

A. The Trial Court Erred in Instructing the Jwy.
The Idaho Supreme Court holds that a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to
effect to the requirement that the State prove every element of an offense. State
170 P.3d 886, 891-92 (Idaho 2007). Indeed, "[j]ury instructions must

Anderson,

inform the jury as

to the elements of the crime charged." State v.
There is no doubt that the felony injury to a child jury instructions put to the jury during
deliberations \vere erroneous. TIU: 1660 (trial court: "clearly the

3

are

itto
[Defense counsel]: The instructions that were submitted to the jury and that the
[jury] has rendered a verdict on actually only end up convicting Mr. Sellers of
misdemeanors. The pattern [ ljury instruction for injury to child with a felony,
I note there's an element
is not included on the instructions on which the
jury has deliberated.
[Trial Court]. That's more than a technicality.
[Defense Counsel]: That is.
[Trial Court]: So what is your point relative to that?
[Defense Counsel]: Well, the instructions that have been submitted track Jury
Instruction 1243, which is an injury to child. For it to be a felony injury to
child, there is a necessity that 1244, that each of these convictions must include
"the above occurred under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great
bodily harm or death to the child." So I believe at this point jeopardy is
attached and the defendant stands convicted of five misdemeanor counts.
THI: 1653-54. More correctly stated, the initial instructions stated the elements for injury to a
child without the distinguishing element that determines if the conduct was felonious or a
misdemeanor.

elements instructions
INSTRUCTION NO. 16

l.
2.
3.
4.
5.

In order for the defendant to be guilty of Count I, charging Injury to Child,
the state must prove each of the following:
On or about March
2012;
the State of Idaho;
the Defendant, Cody Sellers;
willfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on N.T.; and
was
18 years of age.

4

The charging instruction (Instruction 2) listed five counts of felony injury to a child.
difference in
circumstances or conditions
circumstances or conditions

bet\veen a felony and a misdemeanor are:
to produce great bodily harm or death" for the felony;

than those likely to produce great bodily harm or

death" for the misdemeanor. Idaho Code § I 8-1501 ( 1)-(2) (emphasis added); cf R.11-15
(Complaint). Also,

a felony conviction for

a

the State must prove that such person or health

in a situation endangering the child,

endangered" while a misdemeanor requires

that such person or health "may be endangered." Id.

If a felony is charged, the wording of the statute precludes guilt under subsection (2), if
subsection (1) exists. For the jury to convict Sellers of five misdemeanor counts of injury to a
child, it required a specific finding that the injuries occurred "under circumstances or conditions

other than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death." Id. (emphasis added). The felony
portion of the statute is mutually exclusive of the misdemeanor. Conduct falls either in the felony
category or the misdemeanor category but not both because the distinguishing element is the
"circumstances/condition" element that is either present, in which case it is a felony, or absent, in
which case it is a misdemeanor. It cannot be both. In initial deliberations,

found Sellers

guilty of injury to a child without any language at all in the instructions regarding the "conditions

5

any
was then sent out to consider the actual bodily injury enhancement
State in Part II, as to

the next day,

V. THI: 1650-52. Upon further

trial court also noticed that the Idaho Code § l 9-2520B enhancement instruction, number 28, was
incorrect and modified that instruction. TUI: 1694-95; R.336-37. The first number 28 instruction
conflated the "under circumstances" element required for a felony conviction with the bodily
injury enhancement requirements, thus confusing the jury even more. Id.
Rather than declare a mistrial, the trial court determined that the proper remedy was to reinstruct the jury correctly on both Part I and Part II of the instructions. TUI: 1663-65. The trial
court justified this procedure by case lavv utilizing ICJI instructions 1243 and 1244 in State v.

Young. 64 P.3d 296 (Idaho 2002). TIII: 1688. As described below, the incorrect analysis and
application of State v. Young only served to exacerbate the confusion to the jury caused by the
erroneous initial instructions. The confusion was particularly prejudicial because the jury had
repeatedly been instructed that they had already found Sellers guilty. 1

B. The Trial Court's Analysis o(the Initial Instructions as ''Lesser-Included Offenses"
was Erroneous and was Improperly Applied.
At trial, Sellers' counsel argued that the initial verdict

'·under

likely" element equated to misdemeanor convictions. TIII:1653-54. The trial court accepted this
1 The jury was never instructed to disregard its prior determination of "guilt" or to start
deliberations a new.

6

IL

so
"lesser-included

was erroneous. To

See
(trial court's analysis

invited error in

error).

The ICJI instructions as suggested in State v.

do contemplate utilizing a "special

circumstance'' instruction for the "under circumstances" element required for a felony injury
child conviction.

64 P.3d at

current since

But,

(Young was decided in 2002), prior to Sellers'

does not. The current version reads as

follows:
1244

INJURY TO CHILDREN

INSTRUCTION NO.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of
must prove each of the following:

Injury to a Child, the state

1. On or about [date]
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant [name]
[[4. [wilfully caused or permitted [name of child] to suffer,] [or] [wilfully inflicted
on [name of child] unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering,] and
5. [name of child] was
18 years of age.]
[or]
[4. had the care or custody of [name of child]
5. who was a child under 18 years of age, and

l0

a

7. the above occurred under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great
or death to [name of child]]
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
[The word "willfully" means acting or failing to act where a reasonable
person would know the act or failure to act is likely to result in injury or harm or
is likely to endanger the person, health,
or well-being of the child.]

visited 2/7/2016). That means the trial court did not use

presumptively correct ICJI

instruction. State v. Hopper, 129 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005).
The standardized jury instruction for "injury to a child" appears in ICJI 1243 and does
not include expressly the "under circumstances or conditions other than" element "1243 Injury

'"",_,'1,,,. that does not mean by default that Instruction 1243 is a proper misdemeanor injury to

a child instruction pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-1501 (2). 2 ICJI 1243 is an insufficient instruction

2

Although the trial court relied on State v. Young to demonstrate that the "special circumstance"

procedure was correct, this case actually suggests that Instruction 1243 is not sufficient, on its
own, to be a misdemeanor instruction. 64 P.3d at 299. In Young, instructions 1243 and 1244
were given for the felony count but the trial court refused to instruct the jury on a lesser-included
misdemeanor offense. Id. at 300-01. Where the trial court in Young refused to instruct on the
misdemeanor offense, ICJJ 1243 by itself cannot be the proper misdemeanor injury to a child
instruction.

8

or

IS

at issue in this case and absent from the ICJI instruction. Id.
that
court
uPr,,.,wr

ICJI 1

to a child instruction,

is a proper misdemeanor

in implementing this analysis with the jury. The trial court did not provide a

form instructing the jury as to the lesser-included option. R.327-28 (Verdict I), 340-41

(Verdict ll). Idaho has adopted the '·acquittal-first rule" requiring that the jury consider the
crrP•,tPr

offense before the lesser. Idaho Code § l

304 P.3d

v.

282

(Idaho 2013). This rule states that the district court ·'shall instruct the jury that it may not
consider the lesser included offense unless it has first considered

of the

offenses.

Idaho Code§ 19-2132(c). Here, the jury wasn't even aware they were considering
included"

during the first deliberations, let alone that the trial court entered a conviction

on Count III after their final verdict acquitted Sellers of the count
Finally, assuming that the first set of instructions were properly
instruction pertaining to Count IV, placing N.T. in a situation where

"misdemeanors," the
health was endangered,

was erroneous as it did not include the "may be" language in Idaho Code § 18-1501 (2).
Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in guiding the trial court to this erroneous
"misdemeanor" conclusion. Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant must show "that
counsel's performance was deficient and the deficiency prejudiced the case." Dunlap v. State,

9

lJ
1S

the
different.

outcome

trial counsel's analysis

the first

the first verdict was not objectively reasonable

did not include an element required for a misdemeanor
allowed the trial court to instruct the jury that they had already found

conviction
Sellers guilty

no such finding had been made. Trial counsel should have been fully aware

of the elements required, particularly as he at one point considered submitting lesser-included
to

THI: 1679 This deficient performance resulted in prejudice where the trial

court entered a

conviction on Count HI based in part upon defense

error.

Section IL
Furthermore, the error was fundamental error prejudicially effecting Sellers constitutional
rights. See Perry, 245 P.3d at 978. It is fundamental to a jury trial that the State be required to
prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury can find the
defendant guilty of

offense. See Anderson, 170 P.3d at 891. Relieving the State of that

burden and then instructing the jury that they had already found Sellers guilty of the charged
offenses violated fundamental due process rights.

Sending the Jwy Back for Second Deliberations with New Instructions Was Not

10

(1967)).

California, 386
raised
instructed the jury with the addition

of the
a

the Court re-

instruction on the circumstances under which

the alleged crimes took place, and sent them back for new deliberations. Tlll: 1670-72. The trial
court actually provided the jury

corrected instructions after the jury reached a verdict on Part
recorded. TIII: 1713; see also TI: 101

did not allO\v the first Part II verdict to

(trial court ruled the enhancement would be bifurcated in the instructions). The trial court told

and the verdict which I've been told you've rendered as to a supplement[al] verdict. .. So for
purposes-at this moment I need you to set aside consideration of the supplemental verdict. Id.
Upon reinstruction, the jury found Sellers guilty of four of the five counts of injury of a
child as felonies (Counts I, II, IV, and V). R.342-43. The jury also found Sellers guilty of the
enhancement in Part IL R.344. The trial court entered a conviction for Count III against Sellers
as a misdemeanor pursuant to the first verdict. R.

Cf State v. Nunez, 981 P.2d 738, 744-46 (Idaho 1999) (remanded for resentencing as a
misdemeanor where the jury
a misdemeanor conviction,
not a felony conviction).
3

11

correct

a

the trial court had erroneously instructed the jury that it had found Sellers
Code§ I 9-2132(c). The misstatements

in the initial instructions and

re-instruction procedure "were apt to confuse or mislead the jury" as to \Vhat the State was
actually required to prove. Young, 64 P3d at 299. In fact, during the second deliberations, the
sent back a question to the trial court:
Does the statement, quote, "Such offense occurred under circumstances or
conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death to the child, unquote,
mean what seem to have occurred did produce-underlined-did produce
great bodily harm or death, or in any similar circumstance could that actunderlined-potentially produce great bodily harm or death.
TJII: 1698-99. This question pertained specifically to the additional instruction submitted to the

jury for the second deliberations, Instruction No. 21A, which read:
Now that you have found the Defendant guilty of Injury to Child in Counts I
through V, you must next consider whether the state has proven that such
offense occurred under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great
bodily harm or death to the child. You must indicate on the verdict form
whether or not this has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
R.327. The question shows that the jury was unsure as to how to apply the new instruction to the
element instructions previously given. By that point, the jury had also already considered the first
enhancement instructions, 28 and 29. Those instructions stated "you must next consider whether
the state has proven that such offense occurred under circumstances or conditions likely to
produce great bodily injury to the child," which the trial court

12

after the jury was

with this verdict

THI:1700-01; R ..
jury

thereby entirely defeating the purpose of the
bifurcated instructions.

TI: IOL

These substantial errors in the instructions and the instruction
right to due process
II.

THE DISTRICT

case should be remanded
ERRED IN

anew

A MISDEMEANOR

Sellers argues that the district court erred

violated Sellers

FOR

III.

entering a conviction on Count III after the

jury acquitted Sellers of Count III as charged on the second verdict form. This issue was not
preserved below and is therefore reviewed by this Court for fundamental error. See Perry, 245
P .3d at 978-79. To the extent this error was invited by defense counsel, Sellers also argues that
counsel was ineffective.
While the jury was deliberating on the injury of a child counts

a second time, counsel

put arguments on the record regarding the validity of the initial verdict and the propriety of the
procedure upon recognizing the error:
a
that says not guilty
[Trial Court]: Now let's say they come back
on all five counts. What we have are five misdemeanor convictions. On that I
would readily agree with you, [defense counsel]. If they come back[Defense Counsel]: I think I

agree
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THI: 1693-94. On the day prior, defense counsel indicated that he did not intend for the lesserincluded misdemeanor instructions to actually

submitted, he did not request such on the

record, and he did not submit a lesser-included jury verdict form to that end. TIII: 1679. Thus, it
was improper for the trial court to sua sponte determine that the lesser-included offenses were at
issue without first determining if the lesser included offenses were supported by the evidence
presented in the case. See State

Lopez, 593 P.2d 1003, I 006 (Idaho 1979).

To the extent this error was invited by defense counsel, Sellers argues that it was
ineffective assistance of counseL See TIII: 1661-63. This Court evaluates claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, both under the Federal Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution article I,
section 13, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decision in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must show ''that counsel's performance was
deficient and the deficiency prejudiced the case." Dunlap, 106 P.3d at 385. Counsel is deficient
when "the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id.
Prejudice is shown where "but for the attorney's deficient performance" the outcome would have
been different. Id.
Here, defense counsel's acquiescence to the trial court's conclusion that a conviction
according to the improper and inadequate instructions but an acquittal on the corrected
instructions meant Sellers was therefore guilty of a misdemeanor, was objectively unreasonable.

14

it was

to

because "the testimony that we heard throughout the entire
"under

or

pertained to the

likely to produce great bodily harm or

death." TIil: 1657. Finally, the lesser-included instructions

verdict form were not properly

put before the jury, as noted supra in section l(B).
This Court has previously determined that trial courts do have '·authority to sua sponte
on

included offenses provided the

such instructions was reasonable

based on the evidence presented." State v. Rae, 84 P.3d 586, 589 (Idaho

App. 2004). Here

though, there was no analysis as to whether such instructions were appropriate given the
evidence-the misdemeanor instructions were submitted to the jury solely in error and without
an appropriate verdict form. The trial court also relied on Young in its conclusion that
misdemeanor injury to a child is a lesser-included offense of felony injury to a child. The Young
Court accepted this proposition without analysis but as noted supra in section I, the misdemeanor
offense is not a true lesser-included offense of the felony as each crime requires proof of a
different element. See State v. Marek, 736 P.2d l 314, 1319 (Idaho 1987).
Sellers was prejudiced by the acquiescence

defense counsel because the trial court

ultimately entered a misdemeanor conviction and sentenced Sellers to the maximum penalty on
Count III. This Court should vacate Sellers' misdemeanor conviction on Count III.

m

Court

counts

on both charges when both

V to be put separately before the jury

"constitutional protections against

counts merge as a single criminal

double jeopardy present[s] questions of law which [this Court] exercise[s] free revie\v." State v.
Moad, 330 P.3d 400,404 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). This issue was preserved in Sellers' Motion to

Dismiss Count IV or V, filed prior to trial. R.128.
In Counts IV and V of the Information, the State charged Sellers with two counts of
felony injury of a child, both occurring on May

2012. R. 106. Count V alleged injuries to N

occurring on May 4th, and Count IV alleged that Sellers failed to seek medical assistance for
those injuries inflicted upon N.T. R.13-14. Prior to trial, Sellers moved the trial court to dismiss
one of the counts, arguing that charging Sellers for two crimes out of the single criminal episode
on May 4, 2012 violated the constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy. R.128; Tr: 1-27. The
trial court denied Sellers' motion to dismiss, finding that the charges did not violate either federal
or state double jeopardy protections. R.176-83.
Pursuant to the U.S. Fifth Amendment and Idaho Constitution, article L section 13, no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. These constitutional provisions afford
protection against "a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal punishments for the
same offense."

v. 1HcKeeth, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). The district court
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counts

same

same

and the same injuries. It was therefore error to try both counts because doing so allows
multiple

same offense
of the federal and state constitutions.

A. Blockburger Test
The United States Supreme Court
prosecution or conviction

a "statutory theory" to decide if a defendant's

punishment for two

violates double jeopardy. See

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). This theory provides:
[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there have
been two offenses or only one for double jeopardy purposes is whether each
statutory provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.

State v. Corbus, 256 P.3d 776, 779 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011) (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304).

In other word, the federal examination is one of "strict elements[,]" looking "only to the statutory
elements of the crimes. State v. Kinney, 291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (Idaho 2013).
In the instant case, Sellers was not charged under "two distinct statutory provisions."

Corbus, 256 P.3d at 779. Sellers was charged under the same code provision for felony injury to
a

thus

are

(1) Any person vvho, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great

bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts
mental
or
care or
child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such

(2) Any person
circumstances or conditions other than those likely
to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to
suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or
having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person
or health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child
to be placed in such situation that its person or health may be endangered, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
(5) As used in this section, "willfully" means acting or failing to act where a
reasonable person would knmv the act or failure to act is likely to result in
injury or harm or is likely to endanger the person, health, safety or well-being
of the child.
Idaho Code § 18-150 l.

district court found that double jeopardy was not implicated under

Blockburger where "the facts which give rise to each of the respective claims are different and
the elements as they would be charged in the jury instructions are different R.178-79.
There is no question that Count IV as charged alleged "the defendant willfully caused the
child's person or health to be injured by the act of failing to obtain medical attention," TUI: 1568;
while Count V as charged alleged the defendant "willfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or
mental suffering on N.T." Id. But, in State v. Afojfat, the Idaho Court of Appeals applying the

Blockburger test went further, stating "it is generally held that when a person commits multiple
acts against the same victim during a single criminal episode and each act could independently
support a conviction for the same offense, for the purposes of double jeopardy the 'offense' is
typically the episode, not each individual act. 300 P.3d 61, 65 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013). ln that
case, this Court evaluated whether Moffat was properly
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and

attempted

The circumstances here are similar in that

State charged Sellers with the "same

in independent counts but these counts arose
double jeopardy violation, this Court

the same

Given

vacate Sellers' conviction for either Count IV or

V and remand for resentencing.

B. Idaho State Constitution
Unlike the federal analysis, Idaho has adopted the ·'pleading approach" to examine
whether a prosecution or conviction and

violates state constitutional double jeopardy

protection. "Under this pleading theory, a court must consider whether the terms of the charging
document allege that both offenses arose

the same factual circumstances such that one

offense was the means by which the other was committed." State v. lvfoad, 330 P.3d 400, 404
(Idaho Ct App. 2014) (citation omitted). "This inquiry requires consideration of the
circumstances of the conduct, and consideration of the intent and objective of the actor." State v.
1viajor, 725 P.2d 115, I 19 (Idaho 1986) (internal citations omitted). "[I]f it appears that the

double jeopardy bar may be implicated, the court must make a factual inquiry as to whether the
crimes were parts of one continuing event or transaction." lvfoad, 330 P.3d at 450. "Whether a
course of criminal conduct constitutes one offense or several depends upon 'whether or not the
conduct constituted separate, distinct and independent crimes.
P.2d at 119).
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Id. at 406 (quoting Afajor, 725

V
12:01
this time period, N

to

on

2012. R.l

15.

to

suffered a traumatic brain injury resulting

that

a rapid onset subdural

hematoma, retinoschisis, and retinal hemorrhaging. TI:4 76-78; TII:l l 05. Over approximately
twenty-three minutes, Sellers recorded multiple, short cell phone videos ofN.T., which were
examined by the medical expert witnesses and law enforcement witness. State's Trial

1-6.

The testimony elicited at the preliminary hearing and trial suggested that over the time period,
N.T.'s physiological condition deteriorated. PH:11

5; TI:473. The evidence also showed that

Sellers contacted Baret frequently during this timeframe to find out how she wanted to handle
the situation. See State's Trial Ex.32.
In finding that the charges did not violate Idaho double jeopardy protections, the district
court found prior to trial that the pleading theory "does not lead to the conclusion that the two
counts are the same crime" as "[i]t would be incongruent and inconsistent to conclude that the
Defendant used his physical abuse of the child as a means to commit the crime of failing to seek
medical assistance after the child was injured by said abuse. R.180. This analysis is in error
because the willful infliction of the injury substantiating Count V was the means by which the
failure to act alleged in Count IV was potentially harmful. But for Count V, there would be no
allegation of Count IV and thus the injury

the means by which'' Count IV occurred.

This Court should vacate Sellers' conviction for Count IV or Count V and remand for
resentencing.
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IV

trial court

argues that

V

in submitting to the jury and thereafter

. This

Sellers to Count IV as a

was not specifically preserved but may be

by this Court for fundamental error.

Moad, 330 P.3d at 403.
In order to obtain relief on appeal, a defendant claiming fundamental error
must demonstrate that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious
without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in
the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.

Id. In determining whether to apply the enhancement to Counts IV and V, the district court
stated:

I can't see a reasonable interpretation of count four, which is-yeah, count
four, which is to fail to seek medical attention-I'm looking for the specific
instruction so that the record is clear-that is Instruction 19, that is, "The
defendant willfully caused the person's"-"the child's person or health to be
injured by the act of failing to obtain medical attention."

I don't see a causative relationship between failing to seek medical attention
and causing subdural hemorrhages and/or bilateral retinal hemorrhages and/or
bilateral retinoschisis.
In other words, for the defendant to [be] guilty of the great bodily injury
enhancement, in my view, there had to be a conviction on charges that
produced that potential injury. And the failure to seek medical attention did not
cause those three-any one of those three
may have
worse; I'll concede that. But I don't think they caused them.
THI: 1646-47. By the trial court's own analysis, it determined that the '·circumstances or
conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death" to support the
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in Part U

IV

to
or

For

reason,

Count IV as a

court

misdemeanor or at least sentenced Sellers for Count IV as a misdemeanor instead of a felony.
case should be remanded for resentencing on Count IV as a misdemeanor.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING SELLERS FOR MINIMUM FIXED
TERMS INSTEAD OF THE MEDIAN RECOMMENDED SENTE>!CE OR PROBATION.

sentence for Sellers convictions. This
issue was preserved in Sellers' Rule 35(b) motion, R.478; and is reviewed by this Court for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Burdett, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000). "To show an abuse
discretion, the defendant must show that the sentence,

light of the governing criteria, is

excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Stevens, 191 P.3d 217,226 (Idaho
2008) (citation omitted). Upon contention of an excessive sentence, this Court conducts an
independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of public interest. See State v. Reinke, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1982).
Sellers argues that the fixed term sentencing is unreasonable upon the facts of the case.

See State v. Nice, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (Idaho 1982). In particular, Sellers challenged the fixed term
years

an

the

on such count as excessive. See RA 78-79. Further, Sellers argues that the fixed five-year terms
on Count I,

are
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on
were

to abuse \Vas based on his belief that the preceding events on May 4, 2016 must
been abuse. TH: The jury

testimony heavily as they sent back

question during initial deliberations asking, "Do \Ve look at each charge without considering
what happened with any other charge? Or do we look at them at all as interrelated?" TUI: l
The jury apparently ''answered their own question.,
As noted by the State in
involvement with the criminal justice

the trial comi responded. TIil: 163 7.

case was

first conviction,

TIU: 1823. He has two other children with his ex-

wife and there have never been any concerns regarding child abuse.
friends, family, and community came forward in

1474-82. Sellers'

and contributed letters and petitions,

attesting to Sellers' good character. THI: 1848-49; see also PSI, Letters. After evaluating the
purposes of punishment, the trial court observed,"[ can't say that I've ever had a case where the
sentencing determination was more difficult than the one that I am imposing today. This is a
challenging circumstance." TIU: 1857.
The typical median sentence in similarly situated offenders, as noted in the PSI and by
the State, is "a median sentence of three years." TIIT: I
factors about, this Court should

upon that and the mitigating

sentence to three (3) years for Counts l,

and V.
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IV,

at any

As

a

conviction for misdemeanor injury to a child based upon the jury's initial verdict on instructions
and without an appropriate lesser-included jury verdict form, was error.
Sellers was never actually convicted of the misdemeanor Count Ill and as such, his sentence is
illegal and should be corrected.
Finally, also as described above, Sellers' sentence for both Counts IV and V where those
arose out a single criminal episode, violated due process

law. Sellers' sentence

should be corrected in this regard.
V.

THE MULTIPLE ERRORS IN JURY SELECTION VIOLATED SELLERS' RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF

LAW.

The Idaho Constitution, article I, section 7, provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate." The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to
the states via the Fourteen Amendment, provides that this jury be "impartial" in order to afford a
criminal defendant due process of law. State v. Brooks,

P.2d 99, l

(Idaho

App. 1982);

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (l 97 l ). Indeed, "the Due Process Clause protects a defendant

from jurors who are actually incapable of rendering an impartial verdict, based on the evidence
and the law." Peters v. Kiff, 407 U

493, 50 I (1972).

Sellers argues that he was not afforded due process based upon the trial court's failure to
State

cause, and based
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0

m
her experiences with child abuse,

10

cause

equivocation regarding fairness and impartiality, and the

fact that Juror 11 vvas her daughter. Further Juror 11 was
by Juror 10 in voir dire and both jurors actually sat on the
exacerbated by the district court's error in denying a

victim of some of the abuse raised
. R.350; TI:347-48. This error was

cause challenge to Juror 20 who

expressed bias in favor of the prosecutor and who the defense had to utilize a peremptory to
remove from the panel, thus preventing

utilizing that peremptory on Juror l 0.

A. Juror 10
During voir

Juror IO responded affirmatively

asked

you or any close

family member ever been the victim of a crime or conduct the same or similar to the offense or
conduct the defendant has been charged with in this case?" TI: 167. In chambers, the following
exchange took place:
[Trial Court]: Okay. Juror Number 10 ... Is that right?
[Juror 10]: Um-hum.
[Trial Court]: You're the mother of the girl sitting next to you, I'm told.
[Juror IO]: Yes. And the story's kind of about her. She was-when she was nine
months old, she was abused by a baby-sitter. And we pressed charges.
[Trial Court]: Okay. All right. What kind of abuse was that, if you don't mind
just sharing.
[Juror 10]: She
her.
[Trial Court]: Beat her?
[Juror 10]: Yup. Um-hum. The whole side of her head was bruised. And it
wasHow long ago
[Trial Court]:
a
was that?

a

[Juror 10]: Yeah.
Court]: The
even
had that
in
past, can you set that aside for purposes of deciding this case? Can you listen to
the end and decide whether or not the defendant is guilty or not guilty based on
that evidence that the State has the burden of proving him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt? Can you hold the State to that burden, and if they can't carry
it find him not guilty? Can you do that?
[Juror 10]: I could try. My stepson's also been abused by his stepdad, so[Trial Court]: So you've had two experiences?
[Juror 1O]: I've had it quite a bit. And we pressed charges on him too.
[Trial Court]: Okay. Well-okay. And I understand that. And nobody has any
problem with that. The question is deciding this case.
[Juror 10]: This case.
[Trial Court]: Where the defendant could be innocent, and you could decide that
the State has not proved their-not carried their burden. And I need an assurance.
I need more than, "I'll try." I need an assurance that that's what you believe[Juror 10]: I would listen to the evidence on it and[Trial Court]: And if you felt that he was not guilty, you could find him not
guilty?
[Juror 10]: Yeah.
TI:175-77. Counsel for the State and Sellers asked follow-up questions regarding Juror lO's
responses. Upon inquiry from Sellers' counsel:
[Defense Counsel]: And when the judge was asking you if you could wait till
the end of evidence and make a decision, you said yeah, you could, but. And
then I never heard the rest of that thought.
[Juror 1O]: Well, it's just an iffy subject. So I want to be honest.
[Defense Counsel]: How would you have completed that sentence?
[Juror 10]: Well, I would listen to the evidence, and-I'd listen to the evidence.
[Defense Counsel]: Did you have a thought that would follow that? I'd listen to
that evidence, but you don't know how fair you could be?
[Juror IO]: I don't know. Because where I've been through it, I-you know,
I-how would Tput it? I would think I'd want to be honest with it and listen to
everything. But you-you know, you don't know where you've been through
that stuff.
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theyou want you on
want me. To be
TI: 179-80. The State went on to attempt to rehabilitate

want me.
10 again:

[Special Prosecutor]: But what we want to make sure is that you could listen to the
burden of proof, that
evidence and make a decision, and if the State doesn't meet
could you find him not guilty. Could you do that?
[Juror 1O]: Yeah. I could do that.
TI: 180. Sellers' counsel challenged Juror 10 for cause due to

experiences with child abuse

and "she went back and forth" on her ability to fair. TI:208-09. The trial court denied

for

cause challenge, stating:
[I]t was a little back and forth. I'm not going to disagree with you on that,
[defense counsel]. But in the final analysis we have to take people at their word
with when they say they can be fair and impartial. She said she could. And I
have no--T don't really have a reason to, at this point, to say she cannot do that.
TI:210. But, the trial court also went on to express he was "troubled by the fact that we have a
mother and daughter sitting on the jury. I don't like that." TI:210. The court and counsel also did
not pull in Juror 11 to inquire about her feelings regarding previously having been a victim of
child abuse.
"A juror lacks impartiality if actual or implied bias exists, and the Idaho Code provides
criminal defendants with the right to strike a biased juror for cause.'· State v. Abdullah, 348 P.3d
I, 36 (Idaho 2015) (citing Idaho Code §§ 19-2017, -2019, -2020). When a juror, such as Juror 10,
"admits bias and gives no unequivocal assurance of the ability to be impartial despite several
efforts by the court or

to elicit such an assurance, the juror should
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disqualified for

0,61

1)

V.

(I

It was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the for cause challenge to Juror
l Oas

court acknowledged not only that she was "back and forth" but also had concerns

regarding the fact that Juror 11 was her daughter-not to mention the victim of some of the
abuse Juror IO referenced in chambers. This issue is not moot because Juror 10 actually sat on
jury, as described below, Sellers for cause challenge to another juror was also improperly
thus requiring defense counsel to use a peremptory to remove him from the jury.
B. Juror 20

Juror 20 responded affirmatively when the jury panel was asked if anyone knew the
county prosecutor. TI: 154. The following exchange regarding this relationship took place in the
presence of the rest of the panel:
[Trial Court]: Okay. Tell me your relationship with Mr. Peterson, then.
[Juror 20]: Well, l know Mr. Peterson, and I trust his judgment. And I don't know if that
would bias anything or not.
[Trial Court]: Well, that's the question. Are you going to be able to-whether you trust
him or like him is irrelevant to me, frankly. The question is, do you-are you going to
listen to the evidence in this case and decide the case based on the evidence, regardless of
[the] fact that Mr. Peterson is one of the attorneys in the case?
[Juror 20]: Yeah. I could do that.
[Trial Court]: Could you do that?
[Juror 20]: Yeah.
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if

serve
18-19.
In chambers, Juror 20 inquired if Sellers'

Amanda Baret Sellers was "George and

daughter" because

had some

to rent to them

"Tl:222. The parties

did not know. Id. Juror 20 was also concerned about his ability to '·stomach" the child abuse
issues given his experience working -with children in his "church assignment" Id. The trial court
inquired, "all I'm asking is whether or not you can listen to the evidence, be fair and impartial,
and decide that question." TI:223. Juror 20 responded, "Well, I think I could.''

Juror 20 was

also a farmer and concerned with the fact that the trial was occurring in the midst of the harvest:
''And then I don't know, we farmers, sitting here. I don't know if we'd be antsy sitting here. I
want to

this thing done. I hope-I don't think I would, but-" Id.
Defense counsel took the opportunity in chambers to question Juror 20 further:
[Defense Counsel]: I've got some questions for Mr. Funk while he's here.
It might be easier to ask in here.
[Trial Court]: Yeah. Okay, sure.
[Defense Counsel]: So you are employed at Funk Farms?
[Juror 20]: I own Bill Funk Farms.
[Defense Counsel]: You own Funk Farms?
[Juror 20]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: Have you or any of your immediate family
contributed to [the county attorney's] political campaign?
[Juror 20]: I have.
[Defense Counsel]: And was your daughter involved in a criminal case
that [the county attorney][Juror 20]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]·
you
[Juror 20]: Yes.
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[Defense Counsel]: Were some felony charges reduced to
misdemeanors?
[Juror 20]: You know, I don't remember if they were felonies. I don't
understand all that.
[Defense Counsel]: But you're very pleased ,vith his representation[Juror 20]: I am.
[Defense Counsel]: --and how that resolved in that case.
[Juror 20]: I am. Yes.
TI:223-25. Defense counsel motioned

court to dismiss Juror 20 for cause. TI:251

R.349.

Sellers' motion for cause to dismiss Juror 20 was denied after the State objected. TI:252-53.
Defense counsel renewed his for cause challenge later:
[Defense Counsel]: I would like to renew a motion for cause related to
Mr.-to Juror Number 20.
[Trial Court]: Okay.
[Defense Counsel]: And I-we just discussed his relationship with the
prosecutor and my sense is that he-he-I mean I know everyone in
town knows [the detective] everyone in town knows [the county
prosecutor]. My sense is that he-his business relationships and political
relationships go beyond just knowing who the prosecutor is, and so I
would ask that he be struck for cause at this point.
[Trial Court]: [Juror 20], let me ask you a question. Please stand, if you
would sir. The question is can you serve as a fair and impartial juror in
this case, listening to all the evidence dispassionately and making an
informed decision without regard to any kind of contact or association
you've ever had with [the county attorney]?
[Juror 20]: I think so.
[Trial Court]: You don't think there would be any problem with that?
You're not going to favor the state's case because you have some kind of
political or other association with [the county prosecutor]. Is that true?
[Juror 20]: No, I wouldn't favor him because of that
[Trial Court]: All right. Would you favor it for any reason?
[Juror 20]: No.
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did not
on

TIII:1

Post-trial, Sellers' defense

additional

20's relationship \Vith the Power County prosecutor. See
involved the

any

clarifying

regarding Juror

THI: 1730-44. In fact, the

county prosecutor, but the prosecutor had indeed been involved in

investigating Juror 20's daughter in another case. THI: 1730-35. This issue was raised before the
trial court by Sellers as a basis for the court granting him a new trial and was subject to post-trial
proceedings including a discovery request and conference with the trial court. R.359-60, 420-22;
TIII:1730.
The prosecutor argued in response that the

of Juror 20's bias was "moot" because

Juror 20 "wasn't actually on the jury'' and "because [defense counsel] didn't challenge any other
jury member, anyone that actually made it into the panel." THI: 1737. As noted above, this
assertion is incorrect as a challenged juror did in fact make it on the jury. See State v. Ramos, 808
1313, 1314-15 (Idaho 1991) (where a peremptory is

defendant must show one of

remaining jurors was biased against him).
As a result of the failure to strike these biased jurors for cause, the jury empaneled was
a new trial

not impartial and this case should be
VI.

SELLERS SHOULD RECEIVE A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS DOCTRINE.
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a
was ·'an
but
the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right
to

process.

V.

965 P.2d l

183 (Idaho 1998) ( quotations omitted).

Sellers has described several errors above. In particular, the trial court erred in permitting
both Counts IV and V to be tried and sentenced; the trial court erred during jury selection in
denying for cause challenges that resulted in a biased juror being seated; the trial court erred both
in initially instructing the jury, and in the manner the trial court attempted to correct the
instructional errors; the trial court erred in entering a misdemeanor conviction where no
misdemeanor conviction was ever found by the jury. These errors combined, denied Sellers' his
constitutional right to due process, warranting a new trial.
CONCLUSION

Sellers makes several claims of error in trial proceedings that either warrant vacating one
or more of his convictions, remanding for a new trial, and/or resentencing. Sellers asks this Court
to provide the remedy appropriate to the substantial errors.
Dated this 101h day of February, 2016

Dar
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Counsel for Appellant
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